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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Charles Baker asserts that the district court committed fundamental error 
pursuant to Perry1 when it imposed a vindictive prison sentence on Mr. Baker because 
he opted to plead guilty via an Alforcf plea in regard to one of the two charges against 
him (he entered a traditional plea in regard to the other charge). He claims that the 
vindictive sentencing violated his constitutional rights to due process. He also asserts 
that the district court insufficiently considered various other factors when it imposed 
sentence, going so far as to inappropriately impose a longer prison term in order to 
attempt to foster rehabilitation (despite clear, recent United States Supreme Court 
precedent holding such conduct to be erroneous and Idaho Supreme Court precedent 
upholding similar rationales to those articulated by the United States Supreme Court). 
The State misconstrues his argument, believing that Mr. Baker is attempting to 
argue that the district court could not consider his apparent unwillingness to accept 
responsibility in its sentencing determination. Apart from the facts that Mr. Baker 
actually entered a traditional guilty plea to one of the charges against him and that the 
record clearly demonstrates that he did accept responsibility for the actions underlying 
both charges, Mr. Baker's arguments are focused on the district court's pronouncement 
on the record that it was imposing a prison term because he pled guilty pursuant to 
Alford, not because he was not accepting responsibility. In fact, Mr. Baker's argument 
has always been that imposing the harsher sentence because he pled via Alford 
1 State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), reh'g denied. 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
1 
constitutes vindictive sentencing, and it is the vindictive sentencing which violated his 
constitutional rights. As such, the State's arguments, which speak only to the apparent 
appropriateness of the district court's balancing of the factors at sentencing (which 
Mr. Baker continues to challenge), do not actually address Mr. Baker's claims regarding 
the vindictive sentencing, and as those issues are unrefuted, this Court should remedy 
those errors, vacating Mr. Baker's sentence and remanding his case for new 
sentencing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Baker's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. And, as in the Appellant's Brief, Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) page numbers correspond with the page 
numbers of the electronic file "Sealed Charles leo Baker.pdf." 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court imposed a vindictive sentence after Mr. Baker 
exercised his right to enter an Alford plea. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed concurrent 




The District Court Imposed A Vindictive Sentence After Mr. Baker Exercised His Right 
To Enter An Alford Plea 
A. Introduction 
Contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Baker has satisfied all three elements of 
the Perry fundamental error test, demonstrating that the district court's actions, clear in 
the record, violated his unwaived constitutional right to due process by imposing a 
vindictive sentence. The violation is premised on the fact that the district court treated 
Mr. Baker's Alford plea differently than a normal plea, basing its harsher sentence upon 
the fact that Mr. Baker exercised his rights as set forth in Alford. The district court made 
a clear statement of its intent to do so in the record. And that decision obviously 
affected the outcome of the case, leading to the harsher sentence. 
As a result of the district court's error, this Court should vacate Mr. Baker's 
sentence and remand for resentencing. 
B. The District Court's Decision To Base The Harsher Sentence On The Fact That 
Mr. Baker Entered An Alford Plea Was Vindictive And Violated His Unwaived 
Constitutional Rights To Due Process,3 Constituting A Fundamental Error Under 
Perry 
Vindictive sentencing violates the defendant's constitutional rights to due 
process.4 Norlh Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1969), overruled on other 
3 To be clear, the right to due process is afforded by both the state and federal 
constitutions. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CaNST. art.1, § 13. 
4 The State seems to believe that Mr. Baker is asserting that he has a constitutional 
right because he entered an Alford plea. (Resp. Br., p.5. ("Alford did not create a 
4 
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); State v. Regester, 106 Idaho 296, 
298 (Ct. App. 1984). Mr. Baker did not, at any time, waive his rights to due process. 
(See generally R.) The district court made a clear assertion of its reason for imposing 
the harsh sentence it did: "I am going to impose two years fixed, eight years 
indeterminate, for a unified ten-year sentence. And I am doing this in consideration of 
the fact that [Mr. Baker] entered an Alford plea, which essentially means you dispute the 
conduct, but you agree that the state can probably prove most of it.,,5 (Tr., p.32, LS.5-10 
(emphasis added).) The district court's statement reveals that it did not impose this 
sentence because of Mr. Baker's unwillingness to accept responsibility in regard to 
Count I, as the State claims (see Resp. Br., pp.7-8), but only because he disputes the 
alleged conduct. 6 
constitutional right that would prohibit a district court from considering at sentencing a 
defendant's continued refusal to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct.").) That 
belief misinterprets Mr. Baker's argument. Mr. Baker's position is, and always has 
been, that the district court's decision to base a harsher sentence on the fact that 
Mr. Baker entered an Alford plea constitutes vindictive sentencing, and that it is the 
vindictive sentencing which violates his due process rights. (App. Br., p.7.) The "rights" 
to which he refers in regard to entering the Alford plea are those recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court in Alford - that the defendant has the right to "voluntarily, 
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if 
he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." 
Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. He has also consistently recognized that these rights are not 
absolute, as, for example, the district court may refuse to accept such a plea. Id. 
5 The PSI, contrarily, recommended retaining jurisdiction, so as to promote Mr. Baker's 
rehabilitative efforts. (PSI, p.13.) 
6 In fact, Mr. Baker did accept responsibility for the series of his actions which underlay 
both the sexual battery and attempted rape charges. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.12-19.) He only 
disputed the factual allegation that he touched the victim's breast during the encounter, 
which was the alleged basis for the sexual battery charge. (Tr., p.10, L.13 - p.11, L.1; 
R., p.43.) Additionally, he only entered his Alford plea in regard to the sexual battery 
charge, but entered a traditional guilty plea to the attempted rape charge, admitting his 
guilt on that charge without reservation. (Compare Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.11, L.21 with 
Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.23, L.2S.) Therefore, the assertion that he did not accept 
5 
Regardless, the State's position has been recently and expressly rejected by the 
Court of Appeals, which held that "[w]hile failure to acknowledge guilt may indicate a 
lack of rehabilitative potential, maintaining a position of innocence as [the defendant] 
has done here, without additional conduct . . . is insufficient to justify an increased 
sentence." State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 795 (Ct. App. 2012). Because the State's 
assertion that any perceived lack of acceptance of responsibility justifies the harsher 
sentence is expressly rejected by established law, it cannot justify the district court's 
actions in Mr. Baker's case. As such, Mr. Baker, like Mr. Grist, should be afforded relief 
for the violation of his due process rights. See id. 
Furthermore, the district court's intent to punish Mr. Baker for using the 
constitutionally-permissible procedure of an Alford plea is betrayed by its observation 
about Alford pleas: "in sex offenses Alford pleas are problematic with a defendant in 
any case." (Tr., p.11, Ls.7-8.) This belies the State's assertion that the district court's 
action was somehow related to a consideration of the acceptance of responsibility. 
(See Resp. Br., p.8.) Rather, the record reveals the district court's motive and 
expression of intent in regard to the reason for the harsh sentence becomes clear: 
it was to punish Mr. Baker for pleading guilty to Count I pursuant to an Alford plea.7 
responsibility and that justifies his sentence is disproved by the record, and as such, 
cannot be a justification for the district court's actions. 
7 The only other potential explanation for the extensive sentence was to provide 
Mr. Baker with plenty of time to participate in rehabilitative programming. (See Tr., p.32, 
Ls.13-19.) That alternative, however, has been explicitly rejected, by the United States 
Supreme Court for reasons which the Idaho Supreme Court has also endorsed. See, 
e.g., Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2388-89 (2011); State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201, 203 (2007). Therefore, since that alternative explanation is erroneous, it 
cannot justify the sentence, leaving only the district court's assertions regarding the 
Alford plea. 
6 
Imposing a harsher sentence based on the fact that a defendant enters an Alford 
plea constitutes vindictive sentencing. See, e.g., Regester, 106 Idaho at 299 (holding 
that to show vindictiveness, the defendant must show the district court's intent to punish 
him for validly exercising his rights). Just as the defendant has a right to demand a jury 
trial, he also has a long-recognized right to plead guilty, if he so chooses. Ex parte 
Dawson, 117 P. 696, 699 (Idaho 1911); Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 822 (1969); see 
Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. However, the district court is not required to accept an Alford 
plea. 8 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. It did so anyway. (R., p.63, Tr., p.13, Ls.1-5.) And once 
an Alford plea is accepted, the district court is to treat it as any other guilty plea.9 
See, e.g., Howry, 127 Idaho at 96. Therefore, once it is accepted, an Alford 
plea necessarily assumes all the protections (along with all the detriments) afforded 
pursuant to a traditional guilty plea, which includes due process at sentencing. Pearce, 
395 U.S. at 723-24; Regester, 106 Idaho at 298. As such, vindictively punishing a 
defendant for using an Alford plea, as opposed to a traditional plea, violates that 
defendant's due process rights. Therefore, the district court's decision in this case, 
to impose a harsher sentence because Mr. Baker entered an Alford plea violated his 
8 This simply means the right to plead guilty via an Alford plea is not absolute. The 
district court retains the ability to limit its exercise, but that does not mean that once 
such a plea is accepted the district court may deny the defendant his constitutional 
rights because it accepted that tendered plea. See, e.g., State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 
96 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the courts treat Alford pleas the same as traditional 
~Ieas). 
In this regard, the State's assertion, that an Alford plea does not provide some 
preferential treatment for the pleading defendant (Resp. Br., pp.5-7), is essentially 
correct. An Alford plea is to be treated no differently than a regular plea, which means 
relying on the nature of the plea itself to continue treating the defendant as innocent is 
just as inappropriate as using it to justify a harsher sentence. 
7 
unwaived constitutional rights to due process. As such, the first prong of the Perry 
analysis is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
The reason for that decision was stated aloud on the record. (Tr., p.32, Ls.5-10.) 
It is hard to imagine a more clear record in that regard, and thus, the second prong of 
Perry is satisfied here. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. The State's assertions to the 
contrary only speak to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors in the district 
court's overall consideration of the recognized sentencing factors, which it tries to assert 
muddies the waters enough to undermine the analysis on this prong of the Perry 
analysis. 1o (See Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) The State's contention does not, however, refute 
Mr. Baker's assertion regarding the clarity of the record in this regard: the district court 
explicitly said it was imposing the sentence it did because Mr. Baker entered an Alford 
plea. (Tr., p.32, Ls.5-10.) There is nothing unclear about that statement or its context. 
(See Tr., p.31, L.5 - p.32, L.15.) Therefore, the State has failed to demonstrate that the 
record is somehow unclear in regard to the vindictive nature of the sentencing decision. 
Regardless, "failure to acknowledge guilt may indicate a lack of rehabilitative potential, 
maintaining a position of innocence as [the defendant] has done here, without additional 
conduct ... is insufficient to justify an increased sentence." Grist, 152 Idaho at 795. 
As such, the State's assertions are contrary to the established law and cannot 
10 It also attempts to claim that the block quote it provides demonstrates that the district 
court's concern for acceptance of responsibility. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) However, the only 
portion of the block quote which addresses the acceptance of responsibility reads: "You 
did plead guilty. That's accepting responsibility to a degree." (Tr., p.32, Ls.11-12.) 
Contrary to the State's position, the district court actually recognized that Mr. Baker has 
accepted responsibility and credited him for that. As such, the State's position that the 
district court was concerned with Mr. Baker's lack of acceptance of responsibility is 
further disproved by the record. 
8 
undermine Mr. Baker's showing in regard to this prong of the Perry analysis. (See App. 
Br., pp.7-8.) This clear violation also satisfies the requirement that Mr. Baker 
demonstrate the vindictiveness in the record. Grist, 152 Idaho at 793. 
Additionally, the fact that the sentence was harsher (as opposed to the PSI's 
recommendation for retained jurisdiction (PSI, p.13)) also demonstrates the prejudice 
(impact on the outcome) caused by the district court's violation of Mr. Baker's due 
process rights, satisfying the third Perry prong. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; compare 
Grist, 152 Idaho at 595. The State continues to rely on the erroneous position that 
Mr. Baker did not accept responsibility and argues that means the district court's 
decision did not impact the outcome of the case, and thus, could not be the basis for 
prejudice. (See Resp. Br., p.9; but see, e.g., Tr., p.32, Ls.11-12 (the district court 
recognizing that Mr. Baker had accepted some responsibility in this case).) Apart from 
being disproved by the record, the State's arguments in this regard do not address the 
basic fact that the imposition of a harsher sentence, by its nature, negatively impacts 
the defendant (i.e., causes prejudice). As such, its analysis also fails to undermine 
Mr. Baker's arguments in regard to this prong of the Perry analysis. (See, e.g., App. 
Br., pp.8-9.) 
As all three prongs of Perry are satisfied in this case, this Court has the authority 
to remedy the error created by the district court's vindictive sentencing. As such, it 
should vacate Mr. Baker's sentence and remand for new sentencing, or, alternatively, 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
9 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent Unified 
Sentences Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Baker 
Several of the arguments set forth in Section I of this brief also demonstrate the 
district court's abuse of discretion when it imposed sentencing. For example, the district 
court purported to impose a harsher sentence to promote rehabilitation in the face of 
federal and state precedent rejecting such a rationale. (See note 7, supra (citing Tapia, 
131 S. Ct. at 2388-89; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203).) Similarly, the State relies on the 
perceived lack of acceptance of responsibility throughout its brief to justify the district 
court's actions, despite the fact that its argument is disproved by the record. (Compare, 
e.g., Resp. Br., p.15 ("[Mr.] Baker's refusal to take responsibility for his criminal conduct 
also supports the district court's sentence.") with, e.g., Tr., p.32, Ls.11-12 ([the district 
court]: "You did plead guilty. That's accepting responsibility to a degree.").) 
Otherwise, the State's response does not address many of Mr. Baker's arguments in 
this regard. (See App. Br., pp.9-17.) Beyond its minimal counterpoints addressed 
herein, the State's response is unremarkable and merits no further response, and 
Mr. Baker simply refers this Court back to his Appellant's Brief. The district court's 




Because the district court imposed a vindictive sentence, Mr. Baker respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his case for resentencing. 
Otherwise, because the district court insufficiently considered the mitigating 
factors present in his case, Mr. Baker respectfully requests that this Court reduce his 
sentences as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be 
remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
11 
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